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1Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to formally specify a flow
devoted to the design of Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
resistant QDI asynchronous circuits. The paper first
proposes a formal modeling of the electrical signature of
QDI asynchronous circuits. The DPA is then applied to the
formal model in order to identify the source of leakage of
this type of circuits. Finally, a complete design flow is
specified to minimize the information leakage. The
relevancy and efficiency of the approach is demonstrated
using the design of an AES crypto-processor.
I. Introduction and motivations
Since the discovery of the Power Analysis attacks such
as Single Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power
Analysis (DPA), asynchronous logic has been presented as
a new alternative design solution against side channels
attacks.
In fact, Power Analysis attacks with DPA firstly
introduced in 1998 by Paul Kocher [1] use the weakness of
chip hardware implementations and software running on
cryptographic devices (particularly smart card), to reveal the
chip’s confidential information. Secret keys are removed
from device by observing and monitoring the electrical
activity of a device and performing advanced statistical
methods.
Additionally to their absence of clock signal which
demonstrates the practical way to eliminate a global
synchronization signal, asynchronous logic is well-known
for its ability to decreasing the consumption and to shape
circuits’ current. [2][3][4] demonstrate how 1-of-n encoded
speed-independent circuits improve security by eliminating
data dependent power consumption. Symmetry in data
communication and data processing, persistent storage,
timing information leakage and propagating alarm signals
(to defend chip against fault induction) are design aspects
addressed by those papers for increasing chip resistance.
The countermeasures that used the Self-timed circuit
properties are all focused on balancing the operation
through special DI Coding scheme. The concrete results of
these approaches which illustrates how is Quasi Delay
Insensitive asynchronous logic factor effective for resisting
against DPA has been presented in [5]. By investigating and
analyzing three different QDI DES architectures and design
styles, it is demonstrated how the properties of 1-of-N
encoded data and four-phase handshake protocol
significantly improve the DPA resistance. However this
study has also pointed out the limits of this design approach
methodology by showing some residual sources of leakage.
This paper is focused on these residual sources of
leakage that are still observable when implementing a DPA
attack on secured QDI asynchronous circuits as described in
[5]. The objective of this paper is to formalize a model of
the current dissipated in this type of circuit in order to
identify the sources of these remaining leakages and thus
propose a new design flow to reduce them.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the asynchronous properties that are used to design a DPA
resistant chip, especially N-rail quasi delay insensitive
asynchronous logic together with four-phase protocol.
Section III investigates the electrical current model of this
type of circuit and then section IV recalls the DPA attack
skill by applying the attack on the model. Validations are
presented in section V. The improvement of the design flow
and results are reported in Section VI. The paper is
concluded by giving some design perspectives in section
VII.
II. Asynchronous logic and DPA
Asynchronous circuits represent a class of circuits which
are not controlled by a global clock but by the data
themselves. In fact, an asynchronous circuit is composed of
individual modules which communicate to each other by
means of point-to-point communication channels.
Therefore, a given module becomes active when it senses
the presence of incoming data. It then computes them and
sends the result to the output channels. Communications
through channels are governed by a protocol which requires
a bi-directional signalling between senders and receivers
(request and acknowledge). They are called Handshaking
protocols [6] which are the basis of the sequencing rules of
asynchronous circuits.
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Asynchronous
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Acknowledgement
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Fig. 1: Handshake based communication between modules.
A module can actually be of any complexity.
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2There are two main classes of handshaking protocols: two-
phase protocol and four-phase protocols. In this work, only
the four-phase protocol is considered and described.
• Four-phase protocol
This protocol requires a return to zero phase for both
data/requests and acknowledgements.
Data
Ack
Com. "n" Com. "n+1"
Inv alid DataValid Data
Phase 1 Phase 4Phase 3Phase 2
Valid Data
Fig. 2: Four-phase handshaking protocol
Phase 1: Data detection (invalid Data to valid Data)
Phase 2: Acknowledgement is set to one
Phase 3: Data are re-initialized (valid Data to invalid Data,
return to zero phase)
Phase 4: Acknowledgement is reset (return to zero phase)
Contrary to synchronous circuits where the shape of the
current (current peaks) depends on the previous states and
data values, QDI asynchronous logic using a four-phase
protocol re-initializes all previously activated nodes before
processing a new data. This behaviour enables the designer
to precisely control the transitions involved in a given
computation (fig. 3). Moreover, because it is based on
hazard free logic QDI asynchronous circuits eliminate all
current variations caused by glitches.
Fig. 3: Types of transitions
• Signalling
As presented above, the implementation of a four-phase
handshaking protocol requires sensing the presence of data
in phase 1 and phase 3. In order to do so, dedicated logic
and special encoding are necessary for sensing data
validity/invalidity and for generating the acknowledgement
signal.
- Data/ Request encoding
Considering that one bit has to be transferred through a
channel using the four phase protocol, one bit has to encode
three different values: invalid, valid at ‘1’, valid at ‘0’. Two
wires (A0, A1) are then required to encode the three states.
This technique is called dual-rail encoding (table1).
- Acknowledge / Completion signal generation
The acknowledgement signal is generated by taking
advantage of the data-encoding. As depicted in fig. 4, a Nor
gate is usually used to sense the dual-rail encoding output
for generating the completion signal.
Table 1: Dual rail encoding of the three states required to
communicate 1 bit.
Channel data A0 A1
0 1 0
1 0 1
Invalid 0 0
Unused 1 1
Dual rail encoding is easily extended to N rails. It is
called 1-of-N encoding. This encoding data scheme is
useful to reduce the number of electrical transitions
involved in a given computation which reduces the power
consumption. For the sake of DPA resistance, 1-of-N
encoding ensures that the same number of transitions is
required to encode the values 0 to N-1.
• Balanced data path
As an example, consider the xor function. Fig. 4 shows a
dual-rail xor gate implementation. Every computations of
this dual-rail xor gate involve a fixed and constant number
of transitions regardless of the data values. Hence, the
opportunity to have data independent power consumption
i.e. not correlated to the processed data is exactly the goal to
achieve for DPA resistant chip.
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Fig. 4: Dual-rail xor gate with four-phase handshake
protocol. Dual rail “co” outputs the xor function performed
between dual rail inputs “ai” and “bi”.
(Cr is a Muller gate with a reset signal)
The Muller gate (C-element) generates an up-transition
when up-transitions occur at all its inputs, and generates a
down-transition when down-transitions occur at all its
inputs. The Muller C-element’s truth table and symbol are
given in Fig. 5.
E qua t ion
X Y Z
0 0 0
0 1 Z - 1
1 0 Z - 1
1 1 1
Z = X Y + Z (X+ Y )
T r ut h t a b le
Fig. 5: Muller gate or (C-element)
However, the QDI implementation of a function is not
always balanced. In such cases, the gate structure is
modified to ensure that all data paths and control paths are
balanced and do involve a constant number of transitions
[7].
Publication [5] demonstrated that secured QDI
asynchronous logic permit to achieve a very high level of
DPA resistance. However, it also showed that place and
route steps are unbalancing some paths, thus creating
sources of leakage. Let’s now precisely analyze this point
using a formal approach.
III. Electrical model of secured QDI
asynchronous logic
In this section, we propose a current model of a QDI
block implementing all the secure techniques described in
section II. We assume that all blocks of the circuit are
balanced so that a fix number of logical transitions are
required regardless of the input data.
Let us first estimate the power dissipation of a logical block.
Power dissipation in static CMOS gate has the following
components:
1. Static power dissipation due to junction leakage
current, Pl.
2. Short-circuit power dissipation, Ps.
3. Dynamic power dissipation, Pd.
Initial State
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3As Static and Short-circuit power represent about 15% of
the CMOS gate power dissipation, we consider for the
purpose of this study the Dynamic power dissipation (Pd )
which is defined as the power required to charge and
discharge the capacitive load of the gate. Its expression is
given by:
²fCVddPd η=
Where η is a switching activity ratio, f is the switching
frequency, Vdd is the supply voltage, and C is the total
charge of the output gate node, defined by: C=Cl+Cpar+Csc
in which Cl, represents the load capacitance (gate and
routing capacitance), Cpar is the parasitic capacitance, and
Csc is the Short-circuit equivalent capacitance. This model
of power dissipation can be extended to a CMOS gate
working in a QDI asynchronous environment.
²CVddfP ada η=
Where fa is the switching frequency of the acknowledge
signal. The fix number of logical transitions in each QDI
asynchronous block offers the possibility to estimate the
block’s dynamic power dissipation. Let Nt be a number of
logical transitions (Nt is fixed for each block). The block’s
dynamic power dissipation is given by:

=
=
tN
i
iadb VddCfP
1
²η
The aim of the asynchronous balanced paths is to always
have the same current profile regardless of the data
computed. This modeling of the power dissipation shows
that in spite of having the same number of transitions, the
loading charge of each gate is not necessarily equal. Let
then estimate the dynamic current dissipated in a block. The
gate dynamic power dissipation is given by:
dt
dV
CtI =)(
Let define Nc as the number of gates along the critical
data-path. Nc represents the maximum number of gate in
series in the block. This number (Nc) can be used to divide a
block in Nc logical levels. Nij is the number of gate
switching at each logical level (Nc). The expression of the
block dynamic current profile is now expressed by:
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Iij(t) represents the dynamic current of the jth gate of level i
and Pdn is a dynamic noise function. The values Nt, Nc and
Nij are determined by a simple analysis of a graphic
representation of the block. For example, let consider the
block of fig. 4. Its representation in the form of a directed
graph is presented in fig. 5 (Gxor=(V,E)). The directed graph
Gxor(V,E) is built from the gate Netlist by defining all the
gates as the elements of the set V (vertices) and all the
interconnections as the elements of the set E(directed
edges).
The graphic representation adopted in this study is well
appropriated for this type of analysis. In the one hand, it
offers the opportunity to formally verify the logical
symmetry of the data-path and in the other hand it offers the
possibility to annotate the graph with information collected
at each different phase of the design.
Mi, Oi, Hi and Ni are annotated with all gates’ parameters
and edges Ei are annotated with all nets’ parameters.
These annotations after the back end step permit to take
into account logical and real physical elements in the graph
analysis.
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Fig. 5: Annotated directed graph Gxor(V,E) of the
Dual-Rail gate Xor.
All dotted lines represent inputs and outputs of the block.
We deduce through the graph exploration the values of Nt,
Nc and Nij :
Nt= Nc=4 ; N1j=N2j=N3j=N4j=1
Therefore,
( ) )()()()()()( 41312111 tPtItItItItP dnxordc ++++=
Equation (6) represents, in a first approximation, the
profile of the dynamic current of the Dual-rail xor gate. This
approach can be extended to all secured QDI asynchronous
block.
This formal model enables to evaluate the sensitivity of
the secured QDI asynchronous circuits to DPA with high
accuracy.
IV. Applying DPA on the formal model
Before applying DPA attack on the formal model, we
first review the basis of the attack. The formalization
adopted in this paragraph was introduced by Thomas S.
Messerges and Al. in [7].
DPA attack is performed by computing N random values
of plain-text-input (PTIi). For each of the N plain-text-input,
a discrete time power signal Sij and cipher-text-output are
collected. The index i of power signal Sij corresponds to the
PTIi that produced the signal and the j index corresponds to
the time of the sample. According to a DPA algorithm, the
Sij are split into two sets by a separating function D.
{ }00 == DSS ij { }10 == DSS ij
The average power signal of each set is given by:
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Where |no| and |n1| represent the number of power signals Sij
respectively in set S0 and S1. The DPA bias signal is
obtained by:
][][][ 10 jAjAjT −=
If the DPA bias signal shows important peaks, it means
there is a strong correlation between the D function and the
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
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4power signal. Selecting an appropriate D function is then
essential in order to guess a good secret key. The methods
to succeed the attack with a minimum of random values are
presented in [8]. An example of such a D function is as
follows:
1- DES algorithm:
D(C1,P6,K0)= SBOX1(P6⊕K0)(C1)
Where C1 = first output bit of SBOX1 function.
P6 = 6-bit plain-text-input of the SBOX1 function.
K0 = 6-bit of the first round of SBOX1.
SBOX1 = a substitution function of DES with 4-bit output.
2- AES algorithm:
D(C1,P8,K8)= XOR(P8,K8) (C1)
Where C1 = first output bit of XOR function.
P8 = 8-bit plain-text-input of the XOR function.
K8 = 8-bit of the first round of XOR.
XOR = a xor function of AES with 8-bit output.
The number of bits chosen for Ci in the selection
function determinates the number of sets to create. If only
one bit is chosen (which is the case mostly used), two sets
are created as show in equation (7).
Let us apply this technique to a secured QDI
asynchronous design. Choosing a XOR for the D function
implies to analyse the electrical signature of an XOR gate.
This function is chosen because it directly handles the secret
key in most of the cryptographic algorithms.
Contrary to synchronous design where the DPA attack
reveals path dissymmetry of the attacked bit (Ci), DPA on
the secured QDI asynchronous design reveals path
dissymmetry of all rails that are used to encode the attacked
bit. In fact, applying DPA on Dual-rail xor gate requires
comparing the electrical behaviour of paths which compute
rail CO0 and rail C01. Then, the average current signal of
both sets of equation (8) is written as follows:
( ))()()()()()(
2
1][ 41312112110 tItItItItItItA nxor +++++=
( ))()()()()()(
2
1][ 41322214131 tItItItItItItA nxor +++++=
Where In(t) is a noise signal. The electrical signature is
given by:
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∆t represents the physical time taken by the gate to
charge/discharge its output node. This time depends on the
value of C. Recalling that C=Cl+Cpar+Csc..
Equation (12) clearly demonstrates that regardless of the
symmetry of the logical data-path (same number of
transitions in each data-path), the differential current
analysis of two symmetric data-paths reveals the effects of
each gate’s charge capacitance (C). It formally illustrates
the impact of the gate’s charge, particularly the load
capacitance, on the DPA bias signal.
V. Validation using electrical simulations
All electrical simulations are performed with Eldo and
used the HCMOS9 design kit (0.13µm) from
STmicroelectronic. The electrical simulation offers the
possibility to analyze without disturbing signal (noise), the
gate’s electrical behaviour with more details. Hence, the
number of necessary messages (N) is minimal.
Figure 6 illustrates the electrical signature of the dual-
rail xor gate using all load capacitances Clij equal (Clij
represents the load capacitance of the jth gate of level i).
Both evaluation and return to zero phases are analyzed.
Signal S(t) shows a few peaks due to internal gate
capacitance: Short-circuit capacitance (Csc) and parasitic
capacitance (Cpar).
Axor0
Axor1
S
Return to zero phaseEvaluation Phase
Axor0
Axor1
Fig. 6: Electrical signature of a Dual-rail xor gate.
Clij= 8 femto farad.
Let us then vary the value of the load capacitance
(precisely the value of the interconnection capacitance) in
order to evaluate its effect on the gate electrical signature
(Fig. 7). A default (Cd) value of net capacitance is fixed to
8fF (femto Farad).
Fig. 7-a represents the profile of signal S(t) when Cl31 is
two times bigger than Cd. As Cl31 is on the third level, we
have one important peak at the end of each phase. It
corresponds to the last term of the equation (12). When Cl21
is fixed to 2*Cd, two important peaks appear in the signal
S(t) (fig. 7-b). In fact, as this value is inside the data-path,
all computing operations after this gate are shifted by the
time taken to charge/discharge this node. It is confirmed
when Cl11 and Cl12 are both two times bigger than Cd (fig. 7-
c). This dissymmetry is amplified when the difference of
capacitance between both data-paths increases. In fig. 7-d
the values of Cl12 and Cl11 are four times bigger than Cd. As
the difference occurs in the beginning of the block, the
electrical curve of both sets are completely shifted so that
the electrical signature is maximum.
This analysis confirmed the strong dependence between the
net capacitance and the DPA bias signal of the balanced
QDI asynchronous design. This directly points out the
necessity to precisely control the place and route step.
(10)
(11)
(12)
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5d - C l1 1 = C l1 2 = 3 2 f F .
b - C l2 1 = 1 6 f F .
c - C l1 1 = C l1 2 = 1 6 f F .
a - C l3 ’ ’ 1 = 1 6 f F .
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Fig. 7: Electrical Signature of the Dual-Rail Xor gate.
The net capacitances are varying from Cd=8fF to 32fF.
VI. Improving place and route steps
We have demonstrated in paragraph V the effects of the
net capacitances on the DPA bias signal. We now define a
criterion for evaluating the net capacitance difference
between the two rails of a dual-rail channel. If Cli represents
the net capacitance of rail i (i ∈ {0,1} for a dual rail
channel) of channel A, then the dissymmetry of a channel
“A” is defined by the following expression
),( 10
10
ll
ll
A CCMin
CC
d
−
=
As illustrated in paragraph V, the lower the value of dA,
the more resistant to DPA the chip is. By using this
criterion, we can then estimate the channels sensitivity to
DPA.
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Fig. 8: Architecture of AES cipher block. Fig. 9: Floorplan of the AES cipher block.
All blocks are constrained
(12)
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6Table 2: Most critical channels, i.e. presenting the highest
value of the criterion, for versions 1 and 2.
AES_v2 - flattenAES_v1 - hierarchicalVersion
52
0.13
46
25
80
0,06
75
23
74
0,1
83
21
110
0,07
103
6
Dmuxof the AEScore
1,250,910,861dA
2045224223434623Dual-rail S0 | S1
32302625Bit
HBblock of the AEScoreBlock
Traditionally, when the design is not too complex, the
tools operate on a flat netlist which is more efficient than a
hierarchical place and route in terms of area and
performance. Unfortunately, the tool performs multiple
random runs to optimize the design, in which the designer
has no control on the net capacitances.
Therefore, we defined a place and route methodology
which enables the designer to control the net capacitances
and thus the criterion optimization.
The proposed approach is based on a hierarchical place
and route flow which consists in dividing the design into
small blocks and constraining their relative placement. The
cells that implement a given function are gathered in a
specified physical area which limits net length and
dispersion.
This methodology is evaluated on the design of a
secured asynchronous AES crypto-processor implementing
the four-phase protocol, 1-of-N encoded data and balanced
data paths [9]. The architecture of the AES crypto-processor
is described in fig. 8. It is basically an iterative structure,
based on three self-timed loops synchronized through
communicating channels. Channel Sub-key synchronises
the ciphering data-path with the sub-key computation data-
path. The controller (finite state machine) generates signals
which control both data-paths so that they execute Nr
iterations as specified in the Rijndael algorithm [10]. Both
ciphering data-path and Sub-key data-path are 32-bit wide.
The details of the architecture choices are discussed in [9].
Fig. 9 represents the constrained floorplan of the AES
chip (fig. 8) realized with Soc Encounter. To be able to
quantify the benefit brought by the hierarchical place and
route methodology, a flat AES Netlist is also routed to be
used as a reference. Let us name AES_v1, the circuit
designed with the proposed methodology, and AES_v2 the
reference one (flat place and route).
The hierarchical approach has of course a cost in terms
of silicon area. The core area of the first version (AES_v1 -
hierarchical) is about 20% larger than the second version
(AES_v2 - flatten).
To evaluate the benefits in terms of the DPA sensitivity,
we computed for both versions the dissymmetry criterion
for all the channels. Table 2 reports the most critical bits,
i.e. the ones presenting the highest dissymmetry. For the
second version (AES-v2 - flatten), the criterion value can
reach up to 1.25. It represents an important source of
leakage as demonstrated in equation 12 and illustrated in
fig.7. Note that, even though most of the channels present a
low criterion value, the existence of some channels having a
high criterion value greatly degrades the DPA resistance
level of the circuit. Moreover, we observed than the most
sensitive channels are never the same from one place and
route to another, confirming that the place and route process
is not under the designer’s control.
On the contrary, the hierarchical version (AES_v1) does
not present any channel having a criterion value higher than
0.13 (Table 2). The channel net capacitance differences are
therefore drastically reduced with the proposed approach.
VII. Conclusion
This paper presented a logical and electrical formal
analysis of the Differential Power Attack of secured Quasi
Delay Insensitive asynchronous circuits. The definition of a
formal model of the current dissipated in such circuits
allowed us to apply DPA on this model, and thus identify
sources of leakage. From this formal analysis, a design
methodology is derived to limit the source of leakage by
using hierarchical place and route. The gain obtained is
illustrated with the design of a secure AES crypto-
processor. It is shown that a significant improvement is
achieved in theory, with the formal model.
The AES chip was sent for fabrication in August and
will be back in October. DPA will be performed on the chip
to characterize its resistance and verify the powerfulness of
the method. The results will be presented at the conference.
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